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Following the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973-74, the Energy 
Policy Conservation Act of 1975 forbade the exportation of 
domestic crude oil. Natural gas exports have also been 
banned. The logic at the time was simple: Domestic oil 
production was in decline and surging oil consumption 
meant increased imports, primarily from the strife-torn 
Middle East. Why should domestic oil be exported to 
Europe or elsewhere when it could be saved for domestic 
consumption?  That logic was wrong then, and it is wrong 
today. Yet regrettably, it still pervades the public dialogue.  
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Energy security is a world-wide 
problem, not just a U.S. one. 
 
Liberalizing exports of oil and 
natural gas would: 
 Create a more shock-
resistant world economy 
 Mitigate Russia’s alarming 
nationalism 
 Reassure our allies world-
wide 
 Retain the strength of the 
U.S. energy industry. 
The U.S. should lift its ban on 
exporting oil and natural gas. 
Supporters of the energy 
export ban insist that it 
serves a number of domes-
tic interests: keeping gaso-
line prices low, supporting 
the profits of domestic re-
finers, and keeping a steady 
supply of liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) for U.S. petro-
chemical plants.  
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These arguments do not hold up, because they 
ignore the global nature of energy markets. The 
international implications of the export ban 
harm broader American interests and reduce 
whatever domestic benefits the ban supposedly 
provides. Energy security is a world-wide prob-
lem, not a U.S., China, or E.U. problem. We are 
all dependent on the world oil market.  
As Morris Adelman explained many years ago, 
the world oil market is one big bath tub.1 There 
are certainly regional and local particularities 
in oil production and consumption—not every 
drop of oil produced in the world is perfectly 
fungible—but, essentially, we all consume from 
that bath tub.  When oil supply disruptions oc-
cur anywhere, world oil prices spiral and 
worldwide recessions routinely follow. 
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE 
Despite euphoric talk that the U.S. may obtain 
energy independence by 2020, leaving the bath 
tub is not an option. First, U.S. energy autarchy 
would involve a repudiation of the U.S. commit-
ment to free trade—a hallmark of U.S. foreign 
policy that has lifted millions out of poverty in 
Asia and elsewhere. Second, our trading part-
ners in the World Trade Organization would, as 
the global need for American oil becomes clear-
er, immediately seek to bring sanctions against 
the U.S., dramatically affecting U.S. exports gen-
erally. Third, if the disparity between American 
and world prices grows larger, American pro-
ducers will find ways to get their product to the 
world market, regardless of the existing ban, 
but with the attendant inefficiencies that such 
work-arounds would entail.  
U.S. OIL EXPORTS 
What does the bath tub analogy have to say 
about eliminating the existing ban on U.S. oil 
exports? Allowing U.S. exports potentially adds 
an additional 8.7 million barrels per day of 
crude oil to the bath tub. Even with the Middle 
East and Russia producing 27.6 and 10.6 mil-
lion barrels per day respectively, the U.S. pro-
duction will substantially increase the security 
of the bath tub.  
Even though the bulk of U.S. production will be 
consumed domestically, our allies and trading 
partners will take comfort in knowing these 
supplies would be available in an emergency. 
Terrorist groups aiming to disrupt the world 
economy will find their power over oil prices 
significantly reduced. Our trading partners will 
see the U.S. as fully committed to free trade. In 
turn, this will surely give us leverage in pushing 
for greater liberalization of trade and strength-
en U.S. diplomatic agendas. 
Returning American oil to the global bathtub al-
so gives the U.S. more leverage in the market 
with the world's largest oil exporter, Saudi Ara-
bia. The Saudis have just cut prices on oil deliv-
eries to the U.S. market, in an effort to pressure 
and eventually reduce American high-cost pro-
Energy security is a  
world-wide problem, not 
a U.S., China, or E.U. 
problem.  
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Figure 1: U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil  
duction, while at the same time increasing their 
prices for East Asian deliveries. If American oil 
could go to Asian markets, it would reduce the 
Saudis' (and other producers') ability to play 
this differential price game.  
Taken out to its logical conclusion, the ability of 
foreign producers to export to the U.S. while 
American producers are prohibited from ex-
porting their production, could drive domestic 
oil prices down to a level where further invest-
ment in expensive production no longer makes 
economic sense.  
NATURAL GAS 
For natural gas, there is no bath tub. LNG tank-
ers only account for about 10% of world con-
sumption of natural gas. The E.U. in particular 
receives 12.5% of its natural gas supplies from 
LNG and 24% from Russian pipelines. Russia 
extracts the full benefits from its dominant 
market position by charging prices that are 
about 4 times higher than U.S. prices. Even 
though LNG facilities to export gas to the E.U. 
cannot be constructed overnight, eliminating 
the ban on natural gas exports will send a so-
bering message to Russia and also reassure our 
allies. 
INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS 
In the wake of increasing global oil supply, the 
possibility of a double-dip recession in Europe, 
and questions about the short-term future of 
Chinese demand, oil prices fell by nearly 25% 
between June and November 2014. That de-
cline has reduced the leverage that resource na-
tionalists like Russia, Venezuela, and Saudi Ara-
bia can exercise in the global market. They now 
face the difficult task of cooperating among 
themselves to restrict production in an effort to 
drive prices up, or continuing to produce at 
their current levels and see prices fall further. 
To some extent, the United States should just 
stand back and let them have at each other. 
Lifting the export ban on American crude oil 
and natural gas would make it even more diffi-
cult for OPEC and non-OPEC producers to come 
to an agreement on restricting production. 
With American oil added to the bathtub, the 
other producers would have to agree to even 
deeper cuts to put a floor under prices, restrict-
ing their short-term incomes even more than 
would be the case if American oil were kept 
home. The more short-term pain for oil produc-
ers in production cuts, the less likely that they 
will be able to agree on such a plan. 
DOMESTIC EFFECTS 
Even from a purely nationalistic viewpoint, the 
benefits of eliminating the export bans far ex-
ceed the costs. Let’s consider the usual argu-
ments brought up by opponents.  
Will gasoline prices rise? Gasoline is already 
traded in world markets, and the U.S. is a signif-
icant gasoline exporter. World gasoline prices 
already drive our domestic prices. Paradoxical-
ly, allowing our domestic crude oils to be ex-
ported will put downward price pressure on 
equivalent international crude oils. In turn, 
lower world oil prices will most likely reduce 
world gasoline prices and produce a modest 
benefit to U.S. motorists.  
Will domestic refiners’ profits suffer? With free 
trade, domestic refiners will no longer have ac-
cess to artificially cheap domestic crude oils. It 
is no surprise that this group strongly opposes 
any changes. Buying domestic oil at artificially 
depressed prices, refining it, and selling the 
gasoline and diesel in the world market has 
been very profitable. However, their interests 
should not be the primary driver in deciding 
what is in the best interests of the country. 
3 
G
ri
ffi
n
 a
n
d
 G
au
se
 |
 F
re
e 
Tr
ad
e 
in
 O
il 
an
d
 N
at
u
ra
l G
as
 |
 V
o
lu
m
e 
5
 |
 Is
su
e 
5
 |
 N
o
ve
m
b
er
 2
0
1
4
 
ABOUT THE MOSBACHER INSTITUTE 
 
The Mosbacher Institute was founded in 2009 to honor Robert A. Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce from 1989-
1992 and key architect of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Through our three core programs–Integration 
of Global Markets, Energy in a Global Economy, and Governance and Public Services–our objective is to advance the 
design of policies for tomorrow’s challenges. 
 
Contact: 
Jennifer Moore, Assistant Director  | The Mosbacher Institute for Trade, Economics, and Public Policy  
 
Bush School of Government and Public Service 
4220 TAMU, Texas A&M University 
College Station, Texas  77843-4220 
 
Email: bushschoolmosbacher@tamu.edu   
Website: http://bush.tamu.edu/mosbacher 
 
The views expressed here are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Mosbacher Institute, a center for 
independent, nonpartisan academic and policy research, nor of the Bush School of Government and Public Service.  
James M. Griffin is Professor of Economics and 
Public Policy and holds the Bob Bullock Chair. 
F. Gregory Gause, III is Professor and Head of 
the International Affairs Department and holds 
the John H. Lindsey ’44 Chair. 
Both are with the Bush School of Government 
and Public Service, Texas A&M University. 
Source 
1Adelman, M.A. (1984), “International Oil Agreements,” Energy Journal, 5, pp. 1-5. 
Will LNG exports hurt our domestic petro-
chemical industry?  Regardless of whether 
LNG exports are allowed,  the discovery of 
vast shale gas reserves that can be developed 
at current or moderately higher prices means 
that U.S. petrochemical plants are assured ad-
equate supplies at reasonable prices. Com-
pared to higher international prices, they will 
not be at a competitive disadvantage. 
Will environmental issues be exacerbated? 
The environmental concerns associated with 
fracking, particularly those involving the dis-
sipation of scarce fresh groundwater, are le-
gitimate. With prudent regulation and incen-
tives, these problems are fixable. For those 
concerned about greenhouse gases, the solu-
tion lies with incentives for reduced emis-
sions, like a carbon tax, and not with penaliz-
ing domestically produced crude oils. Remem-
ber that for each barrel not produced domes-
tically, one will likely be imported from the 
Middle East.  
In sum, the technological revolution involving 
fracking and horizontal drilling once again has 
made America an energy giant, reminiscent of 
World War II days. By liberalizing exports of 
oil and natural gas, the U.S. can use that power 
internationally to: 
 create a more shock-resistant world 
economy 
 mitigate Russia’s alarming nationalism 
 reassure our allies world-wide 
 
With a new Republican Congress and a Presi-
dent facing numerous international obstacles, 
this is an issue on which common ground can 
be found. 
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